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Introduction  
Focusing on the ontological principles of practice, this chapter explores a possibility of an 
activity-based view of sociomateriality. Although practices have been central to our 
understanding of techno-organizational phenomena and research on sociomateriality 
extensively draws on practice theories (Barad, 2003; 2007; Latour, 2005; Schatzki, 1996; 
2002), the application of practice theory to sociomaterial enquiry has been somewhat 
partial for at least three reasons. Firstly, the treatment of practice and the corresponding 
debates have tended to prioritize epistemology over ontology. That is, discussions on how 
to research socio-material phenomena have dominated (Orlikowski & Scott, 2015) and 
insufficient attention has been devoted to the metatheoretical dimension of practice and 
its philosophical assumptions (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2016). Metatheory concerns the 
metaphysical principles that inform the very basic assumptions behind the theory, 
assumptions that define the notion of reality, existence, humanity, society and the entities 
within it (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Whilst significant effort has aimed at explicating 
sociomateriality and setting it apart from competing paradigms in information studies and 
beyond (Leonardi, 2012; 2013; Orlikowski, 2007; 2009; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; 
2015), scarce emphasis has been paid to its metaphysical assumptions and their 
consequences. In particular, there are limited efforts explicating the metaphysical 
dimensions of practice theories and the implications of the contrasting assumptions 
within competing theories of practice (Schatzki, 2002). 
Secondly, whilst drawing on the theories of practice, sociomateriality has tended 
not to recognize the differences in metaphysical assumptions between the practice 
theories of actions (Schatzki, 1996; 2002; 2010; Reckwitz, 2002; 2012) and theories of 
arrangements (Barad, 2003, 2007; Callon, 1991; Latour, 2005). The former conceive of 
practices as nexuses of ‘doings and sayings’ whilst the latter frame practices in terms of 
constellations of actors that include non-human actors. These distinctions seem somewhat 
obscured in sociomaterial enquiry and key authors tend to cite multiple theorists of 
practice without drawing attention to significant differences between their conceptions of 
practice (see e.g. Orlikowski & Scott, 2014). 
Thirdly, whilst drawing on the broadly conceived theories of practice, 
sociomaterial research tends to favor theories of arrangements (Barad, 2003; 2007; 
Latour, 1992; 2005). That is, empirical studies tend to focus on the assemblages of 
different actors that include non-human entities and networks of relationships between 
the actors that produce practice. In general, within published research, the works based on 
the theories of arrangements dominate and the theories of actions remain overlooked in 
sociomaterial research (e.g. Mazmanian et al., 2014; Scott & Orlikowski, 2014).  
Unquestionably, the conceptual orientation towards epistemology of objects 
(Knorr Cetina, 1997) and arrangements (Latour, 2005) has strengthened sociomateriality 
research and has provided a useful theoretical lens for the empirical study of technology-
practice nexus. Nonetheless, the shift towards arrangements deflects attention from 
metaphysics of practice and downplays the implications of activity for technology in the 
organizational practice. As a consequence, our understanding of how individual actions 
with technology convert into sustained manifolds of organizational activity, how the 
actions of multiple individuals with multiple technologies come to bear on the unfolding 
of organizational realities over time and across space, and how shared understanding, 
meanings, human intentions, emotions and affect practice with/in/through technology 
remains only partial.  
 In an attempt to rebalance the theoretical repertoire within organizational research 
on technologies, the current chapter explores the possibility of an activity-based theory of 
sociomateriality. In extending Schatzki’s (1996, 2002, 2010, 2013) practice theory to the 
study of techno-organizational phenomena, the specific objectives here are to examine 
the ontological status of practice in sociomateriality research and to offer an activity-
based conceptualization of socio-material practice. The key argument advanced in this 
chapter is that a theory of actions may address sociomaterial ‘doing’ and account more 
fully for the role of technology in organizing. Schatzki’s theory of practice (2002) seems 
particularly well suited to the task because its detailed specification of practice provides a 
comprehensive metaphysical and metatheoretical account of sociality that defines 
practice, stipulates a range of relationships between materiality and action, and offers 
possibility of adding specificity to the material, discursive and symbolic relations 
between technology and organizational practice. Admittedly, whilst promoting one view 
of practice, the chapter also acknowledges that this is but one theory and that diversity of 
approaches is warranted and indeed desirable. The purpose here is to enrich rather than 
seek conceptual closure for the study of socio-technical phenomena. 
The chapter aims to make three contributions to the study of techno-
organizational phenomena. Firstly, by examining how theories of practices have been 
conceptualized and analytically deployed in the study of sociomateriality, the paper 
provides important insights concerning the metaphysical status of practice and the 
implications of metatheory of practice for the techno-organizational research. Secondly, 
by explicating how Schatzki’s treatment of practices differs from alternative approaches 
and how its use may be advantageous in the study of socio-technical phenomena, the 
paper challenges the assumption that an activity theory does not lend itself for the study 
of technologies in organizing. Thirdly, by extending Schatzki’s theory of practice to the 
study of techno-organizational phenomena, the study offers a novel application of an 
activity theory.  
Conceptual background  
Although sociomateriality research acknowledges the centrality of practices as the 
ontological building blocks of organizational realties (Orlikowski & Scott, 2015) and 
practices represent a common concern in empirical research (Jones, 2014; Jung & 
Lyytinen, 2012), a closer reading of the literature reveals an important fault line. Studies 
tend to analytically privilege either entities or actions and the scholarship seems split 
between studies relying on theories of arrangements (Barad, 2007; Callon, 1991; Latour, 
2005) versus those sympathetic to theories of activities (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). 
The former conceive of social life as essentially revolving around arrangements of 
entities where social phenomena are organized in configurations and connections: 
humans and non-humans are interlaced into arrangements, which exert influence on other 
configurations and through relations perpetuate social life (Barad, 2003; 2007; Latour, 
1991, 2005). The latter, theories of actions, explore situated actions in contexts (Schatzki, 
1996, 2002; Reckwitz, 2002) and their focus is on patterns of activities across groups of 
individuals.    
The emphasis on the theories of arrangements is much evident in recent 
sociomateriality research. For example, the work of Orlikowski and Scott (Orlikowski & 
Scott, 2013; 2014; Scott & Orlikowski, 2014) builds on Barad’s philosophy (Barad, 
2003; 2007) and focuses on entanglements of humans and non-humans, the social and the 
material (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). Similarly, past research that draws on actor-network 
theory (Mazmanian et al., 2014; Osterlie et al., 2012) provides important extension of the 
arrangement theme. Concepts such as ‘imbrication’ (Leonardi, 2011), ‘assemblage’ 
(Suchman, 2007), ‘mangling’ (Venters et al., 2014), or ‘configuration’ (Mazmanian et al., 
2014) all draw on the notion of arrangements of entities. Evidence of metatheories of 
arrangements can be also found in sociomateriality’s metaphysical assumption - the 
relational ontology. Following Barad (2003, 2007), past research has assumed that 
phenomena do not pre-exist but tend to emerge through relations in practice (Orlikowski 
& Scott, 2015) and material and non-material entities perform practices in an ongoing 
fashion. Contrasted with the research on arrangements, to date, only a few studies have 
attempted to explore techno-organizational phenomena using the activity lens (e.g. 
Fayard & Weeks, 2014; Jones, 2014; Jung & Lyytinen, 2012; Leonardi, 2011). 
Considering the number of studies in top journals, the focus on arrangements seems to 
dominate the current sociomaterial thinking.  
Despite its success in redirecting attention to the situated and emergent nature of 
technology in organizational practice and the significant strides in rebalancing human-
non-human relations in technology research, the shift to theories of arrangements in 
techno-organizational research has been extensively criticized (Faulkner & Runde, 2012; 
Jones, 2014; Kautz & Jensen 2012; 2013; Mutch, 2013). For example, the sociomaterial 
search for balance between human and non-human actors seems to be met with only 
partial success. Human actors tend to dominate empirical evidence because they are the 
only ones that speak (Mutch, 2013). Yet paradoxically, in order to make room for objects, 
the sociomaterial efforts to equalize humans and non-humans within assemblages tend to 
suppress humanity. As a result, the implications of human intentions, emotions and 
affects are largely missing from current studies (Jones, 2014), in spite of their mattering 
for practice (Rezkwitz, 2012).  
There are problems concerning specificity and generalizability of insight. The 
preoccupation with specific narrowly defined settings brings difficulties in accounting for 
broader symbolic and social elements of practice that include the implications of the past 
(Mutch, 2013). The entanglements between humans and non-humans are necessarily 
situated in specific, narrowly defined contexts (e.g. call centers, TripAdvisor) and the 
specificity makes it difficult to extend the findings and generalize across other situations 
and context.  
The analytical efforts to move from individual actions with objects to sustained 
patterns and manifolds of activity - across groups of individuals and underlined by shared 
understanding and meaning - are yet to develop into comprehensive theories of 
organizing (Fayard &Weeks, 2014). The micro-emphasis on networks on human-non-
human relations seems to offer an individualistic locus of practice and ignores both the 
complex webs of cultural knowledge and rules that accompany technology use across 
groups of individuals (Hutchby, 2001) and the social construction of technology impacts 
on practices. Assemblages do not recognize the broader fields of practice (Bourdieu, 
1977; 1990) or the broader networks of relationships in a group and society that create 
the conditions for practice (Fayard & Weeks, 2014).  
Further difficulties concern relational emergence. Sociomateriality claims that 
practices emerge through relations and that everything that exists is continually created 
and recreated through relations (Barad, 2003; 2007). Yet, when addressing technology in 
organizing, studies tend to resort to pre-existing categories and emergence does not seem 
to be easily accommodated either empirically or conceptually (Faulkner & Runde, 2012; 
Mutch, 2013). The critics of sociomateriatity have claimed that ‘many if not most of the 
boundaries and categories we live by in our day-to-day lives are generally quite stable, at 
least relative to our life-histories, and that the same is true of most of the objects 
classified within them’ (Faulkner & Runde, 2012, 60). The concurrent notions of 
entanglement and emergence are proving difficult to implement in empirical analysis 
(Mutch, 2013).  
Past efforts to address these criticisms and move the field forward have involved 
expositions and critical syntheses (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2016; Jones, 2014; Orlikowski & 
Scott, 2015). For example, significant efforts have concerned decomposing the 
sociomateriality program to explicate its principal components and contrast with 
alternatives (Leonardi, 2012; 2013; Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski & Scott, 2015). 
Alternatively, critical syntheses have addressed the program from the epistemological 
perspective, highlighting how its principles translate into a body of research and what 
knowledge does such program generate (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2016; Cecez-Kecmanovic 
et al., 2014; Jones, 2014). For example, Jones (2014) has argued that though the 
principles of materiality, inseparability, relationality, performativity, and practices, 
represent a radical departure from other research traditions, the level of adherence to 
these principles remains varied and marks the split within the field into weak and strong 
sociomateriality.  
While these explanations and the ensuing recommendations are insightful and 
useful, they do not question the basic ontological premises underpinning the framework 
of sociomateriality. Paradoxically, neither the existing expositions of theory nor the 
critiques seem to offer a systematic treatment of metatheory i.e. the fundamental 
ontological assumptions on which research is based and which drive epistemological 
decisions on what research problems to focus on and how research should be carried out. 
The outcome is a level of epistemological confusion as evidenced by the varied and 
selective application of sociomateriality principles (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014). The 
confusion also affects critiques of the program because the act of bundling and evaluating 
theories that are incomparable because they belong to different metaphysical paradigms 
seems to trespass the principle of paradigm incommensurability (Burell & Morgan, 
1979).  
In an effort to address ontological principles in socio-technological research, the 
next section reviews meta-theories of practice. The review provides an opportunity to 
reassess metatheoretical principles and map out the sociomateriality program more 
clearly. By explicating commonalities and differences using established categories, the 
chapter hopes to explicate the metaphysical principles in a systematic manner.  
Metatheories of practice  
Practice theories represent a rich theoretical terrain that permeates research in multiple 
fields of management and organizational studies (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). In 
general, practice theories seek to explain the relationship between specific and situated 
human actions and the broader social context in which these actions take place (Schatzki, 
2002). Although the theories vary in their explanation of the principles and mechanism 
that link individual action with the broader social context, they share a focus on actions, 
reject dualism and accept the principle of mutual constitution (see Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011 for a good overview). Practice theories assume that social life is 
composed of everyday actions and that manifolds of actions across groups of individuals 
create practices (Schatzki, 2002). In denying dualism, practice theories reject oppositions 
(e.g. structure and agency, individual and institutional, cognition and action) and call for 
the construction of dualities that accommodate the polar extremes (Reckwitz 2002). 
Finally, practice theories assume mutual constitution to claim that phenomena always 
exist in relation to each other. For example, social orders depend on human agency that 
produces them and conversely, human agency is shaped by social orders that determine 
its structural conditions (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011).  
Despite similarities, practice theories differ in their metatheoretical assumptions. 
A key shared assumption is that any form of social life transpires through practices, or 
organized patterns of human activities, and that practices are the fundamental blocks 
building social life in multiple domains (Orlikowski & Scott, 2015). However, although 
all theories of practice focus on situated activities, they differ by privileging of either 
entities or actions and theories of arrangements (Latour, 2005; Barad, 2003) can be 
contrasted with theories of actions (Bourdieu, 1977; Schatzki, 2002; Reckwitz, 2002). 
The division is important because it underlies fundamental metatheoretical differences 
that pertain to the conception of social life and the role of objects. The two streams within 
practice theories take an opposing stance regarding the emergence of practice and the 
relative position of humans within that emergence. As a result, the two strands adopt 
contrasting views concerning humanism, nominalism and the emergence of practice 
(Schatzki, 2002).  
The first distinction concerns humanisms versus post-humanism. Humanism tends 
to privilege humans over non-humans and assume that although objects, entities and non-
human phenomena (i.e. wind) may act and exert influence, they do not have agency 
because agency is uniquely human involving intentions. Whilst acknowledging the 
importance of matter, humanism maintains the superiority and primacy of humans over 
non-humans. By contrast, post-humanism (Knorr Cetina, 1997) attributes central features 
of human agency to non-human entities and downplays the uniqueness and significance 
of human agency. The key distinction between the two strands of practice theories is that 
theories of actions defend the privileged position of human agency whereas theories of 
arrangements equate human and non-human agency. 
The second difference concerns nominalism versus contextualism. Whilst 
nominalism contends that sociality can be explained solely through properties and 
relations among particular things, contextualism assumes that these matters must be 
referred to a context that is different from these entities. Nominalists deny existence of 
context and to them, systems, structures or social orders either do not exist or are merely 
configurations of arrangements that are infinitely reducible to arrangements. By contrast, 
conceptualists acknowledge the importance of a wider context and recognize broader 
structures as well as the historical dimension of practice. Importantly, the theories of 
actions adhere to contextualism whilst theories of arrangements follow nominalism. 
Nominalism has important implication for the substantive status of practices. 
Denial of context and focus on ongoing relations conveys the rejection of substantivism 
(preoccupation with the real) and attention to relational ontology and performativity 
where practices are an ongoing accomplishment that is continuously unfolding and 
becoming. Though stabilization may be achieved temporarily, neither the practices nor 
any other entities involved in their productions are ever ‘completed’ or fixed (Barad, 
2007). By contrast, theories of actions seem more aligned with substantivism and 
emphasize ‘the real’ and ‘the actual’. Though practices may be an ongoing 
accomplishment that is co-constituted by multiple actors, the theories of actions argue 
that the presence of practice can be objectively and independently detected because they 
practices have relatively stable and detectable characteristics that are independent from 
their observer.  
Taken together, post-humanism and nominalism that characterize theories of 
arrangements bring certain challenges to the study of techno-organizational phenomena. 
For example, the focus on unfolding, unstable and unbounded assemblages of human and 
non-human entities means that it becomes analytically difficult to separate them in what 
is being examined (Kautz & Jensen, 2012; 2013) and there are issues concerning the 
empirical locus of concrete analyses. A related problem concerns indeterminacy. For 
example, the notion of ‘relationality’ advanced by Barad (2003, 2007) provides little 
specificity to the multiple types of relations between the social and the material (Faulkner 
& Runde, 2012). Concurrently, the focus on immediate objects (like TripAdvisor in 
Orlikowski & Scott, 2014) comes at an expense of the more generalized theoretical 
propositions that apply beyond the immediate empirical setting (Mutch, 2013). 
Consequently, the debate as well as the search for alternative lenses continues (Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2016). The section below exposes Schatzki’s theory of practice as a 
possible new direction for sociomateriality research. 
Activity-based theory of sociomateriality?  
Schatzki (1996; 2002) offers but one theory of practice. Similar to other practice theorists 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Reckwitz, 2002; Latour, 2005), Schatzki assumes that practices are the 
key ontological units of which sociality is composed. Similar to other theorists of 
practice, Schatzki rejects individualism and individualist ontologies and supports the 
principle of mutual constitution where sociality envelops though manifolds of activities 
across groups of individuals and where activity is constitutionally bound with matter. 
Contrasted to other theorists, Schatzki makes a strong emphasis on actions – ‘doings and 
sayings’ – and conceives of practices as ‘manifolds of actions’. Building on Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein, he further assumes that action takes primacy over meaning.  
According to Schatzki (1996), practices are organized bundles of human activity, 
evolving domains of doings and sayings that are linked by and orchestrated through 
arrays of understandings, rules and teleo-affective structures. Practical understandings 
denote the skills, abilities and capacities that inform and help execute the specific actions 
that compose a practice. Understandings are accompanied by sets of rules i.e. 
formulations, principles or instructions that orient, direct and determine the course of 
activity. Finally, teleo-affective structure of practice consists of a set of ends, projects, 
tasks, beliefs and emotions that are expressed in doings and sayings that compose the 
practice. Unlike rules, teleo-affective structure tends to be implicit and suggestive of 
normativity and hierarchy within a practice; when it exists, there is a general agreement 
about rightness, ‘oughtness’ or acceptability of action. A bundle of activities becomes a 
practice when it displays the three features discussed above. 
Although the thrust of Schatzki’s theory concerns social aspects of practice, 
materiality and technology form an integral part of his thinking because ‘activity is 
inherently entwined with objects and it proceeds amid entities that mold it and to which it 
is constitutionally bound’ (2002, 124). Practices are intrinsically entangled and 
interwoven with objects and materiality has compositional significance for practice. That 
significance is reflected in later definitions of practice where ‘social life, that is human 
coexistence, inherently transpires as part of nexuses of practices and material 
arrangements’ (Schatzki, 2010, 124). According to Schatzki (2010), material 
arrangements are sets of entities that include humans, artefacts, and organisms. Similar to 
other thinkers (Leonardi, 2012), he understands that materiality is broader than 
physicality and refutes the notion that materiality forms but a background condition for 
social practice, as sustained in mainstream sociology (see e.g. Garfinkel, 1967 or 
Giddens, 1979).  
How are objects entwined with practices? There are four mechanisms that tie 
practices and material arrangements: causality, constitution, intelligibility and 
prefiguration (Schatzki, 2010). Causality captures the direct influence of actions on 
objects, objects on actions and objects on objects. Human activity may lead to changes in 
objects: humans may create new objects, for example, alter objects, and rearrange 
objects. Similarly, material entities may exert causal effects on human actions and lead 
them to perform activities, follow tasks and pursue ends. Finally, objects maintain causal 
relations among themselves, for instance, an app may cause a heating boiler to switch on.  
The second mechanism concerns constitution and practices and material 
arrangements are co-constitutive in that without objects a practice may not exist or take a 
completely different form. Firstly, objects may be essential for practice in that it may be 
impossible to carry out activities that compose practice without certain objects. For 
example, the practice of online valuation is made possible through digital algorithms and 
immaterialities that support it. Online valuation occurs only when these materialities are 
present and functioning in a satisfactory manner (Orlikowski & Scott, 2015). Secondly, 
objects may be pervasively involved in particular practices at particular times and places. 
Jones (2014), for example, notes that though it is not essential to use objects in medical 
practice, the contemporary medical practices are pervasively entangled with objects. Co-
constitution works in the opposite direction too: without the practices that involve objects 
or are carried out among objects, many material arrangements would not exist. For 
example, a typewriter is now an obsolete object within the contemporary writing practice 
because more efficient writing tools (word processors) have emerged.  
The third type of relation between practices and arrangements is that of 
intelligibility. Intelligibility ‘governs action by specifying what an actor does next in a 
continuous flow of activity’ (Schatzki, 2001, 75) and denotes how things make sense 
(what are they understood to be) and which actions make sense - what makes sense for 
people to do. The material arrangements within practice carry interwoven understandings 
of that practice: a set of technologies for online valuation carries the understanding of 
valuation (Orlikowski & Scott, 2015). To say that objects and practices are tied through 
intelligibly is to assume that objects articulate the meaning of practice and signify the 
actions to perform i.e. they help to channel ‘the flow of unreflective action onto the 
performance of particular actions’ (Schatzki, 2001, 122).  
The final type of mechanism that ties practices and objects is prefiguration. 
Objects prefigure practices by shaping, influencing and affecting the future actions that 
compose practice, specifically, in the very immediate future. Though prefiguration may 
be conceptualized through the notion of constraint or possibility, or fields of possibilities, 
Schatzki argues that such formulations unduly minimize its influence on practice because 
prefiguration is only to a small extent a matter of constraint/affordance and 
exclusion/possibility (Schatzki, 2002, 225). To understand prefiguration is to appreciate 
the multiple ways that the mesh of practices and arrangements ‘makes courses of action 
easier, harder, simpler, more complicated, shorter, longer, ill-advised, promising of gain, 
promising of ruin, disruptive, facilitating, obligatory and proscribed, acceptable or 
unacceptable, more or less feasible’ (Schatzki, 2002, 231). Prefiguration is not about 
opening or closing paths for action but is best understood  ‘as a qualification of possible 
paths of action on such registers as easy and hard, obvious and obscure, tiresome and 
invigorating, short and long, and so on’ (Schatzki, 2002, 103).  
Whereas objects are pervasively implicated in practices in multiple domains, 
Schatzki refutes the notion of ontological equality of humans and objects, argues against 
taking these notions too far and defends ‘residual humanism’. Specifically, for Schatzki, 
there is a distinction between ‘centerdness’ (Knorr Cetina, 1997) and being ‘tied to’ or 
‘moderated by’. In opposition to Knorr Cetina, he argues that colonization of objects of 
multiple arenas of contemporary practice does not entail centeredness. Objects are very 
rarely the focus of practice. Practices serve tasks, projects and ends that go beyond 
objects and are not centered on the objects per se. Instead, objects play role in practices 
due to their usefulness in meeting ends, projects and tasks that the practice stipulates.  
Implications  
As an alternative lens for viewing socio-technical entanglements, activity theory has 
implications for technology research. From the ontological perspective, the theory 
provides a complete metatheory that systematically accounts for all aspects of practices 
thus offering the possibility to address some criticisms concerning theories of objects. For 
example, contrasted with Barad (2007), Schatzki (1996: 2002; 2010) provides a more 
complete understanding of materiality and sociality by specifying what practices are, why 
they matter and how they differ from entities. His rich philosophical account of practice 
provides detailed guidelines for identifying and analyzing practice-materiality nexuses. 
The rejection of nominalism means that it becomes possible to separate the empirical 
focus from the research context; it becomes easier to locate, exclude and prioritize 
research settings and thus avoid the fallacies of infinite regress and indiscrimination. A 
key advantage of the focus on practice is that it allows for theorizing about multiple-
technologies, technological meshes and technology choice that seem to increasingly form 
an intrinsic feature of contemporary organizational technologies (Jung & Lyytinen, 
2013).  
These advantages become more apparent when viewed from an epistemological 
perspective and the distinction between practice and phenomenon (Barad, 2007) becomes 
important here. In contrast with the difficult to locate seemingly boundary-less 
phenomena (particularly when viewed thorough Barad’s compounded onto-
epistemological standpoint), the focus of activity-based practice seems to offer more 
precision. In particular, definitional precision means that it may be easier to observe and 
refute practices than phenomena. Contrasted with phenomena, practice seems to have a 
set of qualifying features that are not entirely dependent upon the observer. Because the 
observation of practice separates an observer from the object of observation (practice), it 
avoids the indeterminacy of phenomena where the agency of observation and the 
observed are combined (Faulkner & Runde, 2012).  
How may an enquiry be facilitated by activity theory? The starting point would 
involve identification of practices and associated material bundles. Using Orlikowski and 
Scott (2015) as an example, an investigation that contrasts offline and online valuation 
practices would still occupy the middle ground position in terms of rejecting duality and 
determinism. However, the empirical design would place greater emphasis on doings 
(valuations) in terms of understandings, rules, structures that would implicate 
materialities of different practices (including digital and non-digital objects) and their 
relationships with tasks, projects and ends. These relationships would stipulate how 
materialities are implicated in the different castings of valuation practice through 
causality, intelligibility, co-constitution and prefiguration.  
Some disadvantages of activity theory have to be acknowledged. Unlike the 
theories of arrangements, the activity view has not been developed with objects in mind, 
not least the quasi objects of digital type (Faulkner & Runde, 2011) and translating its 
propositions into the realm of technology and organizing is not an easy undertaking. The 
difficulty is compounded by the theory’s emphasis on ontology and almost absolute 
absence of epistemological guidelines. By his own admission, Schatzki (2002) is not 
preoccupied with epistemology and thus provides little assistance in extending the theory 
to empirical designs. Beyond these concerns, the major issue is agential humanism and 
the somewhat diminished role of objects that follows from activity theory. These 
ontological assumptions run contrary to the principle of equivalence between humans and 
objects which represents a key attraction of the sociomateriality program.  
Conclusion  
This chapter aims to advance techno-organizational research by offering an activity 
perspective on human-object relations. By revisiting the notions of post-humanism and 
nominalism and exploring the activity-based view of sociomateriality, the chapter offers a 
revised option of practice theory that may be used by organizational scholars in 
technology studies. The chapter argues that the activity view offers advantages by 
providing boundaries to the phenomena under investigation and by accommodating the 
context of practice and thus sets new avenues for empirical research on techno-
organizational phenomena. Given the increasing proliferation of multiple organizational 
practices with information technologies such work seems highly warranted and urgently 
needed.  
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